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Abstract. Negotiation between agents aims at reaching an agreement in
which the conflicting interests of agents are accommodated. In this paper,
we present a concrete negotiation scenario where two agents are situated
in a maze and the negotiation outcome is a cell where they will meet.
Based on their individual preferences (a minimal distance from their
location computed from their partial knowledge of the environment), we
propose a negotiation protocol which allows agents to submit more than
two proposals at the same time and a conciliatory strategy. Formally, we
prove that the agreement reached by such a negotiation process is Pareto-
optimal and a compromise, i.e. a solution which minimizes the maximum
effort for one agent. Moreover, the path between the two agents emerges
from the repeated negotiations in our experiments.
1 Introduction
Negotiation is a form of interaction in which a group of agents with conflicting
interests try to reach a mutually acceptable agreement over some outcomes [1].
The outcome is typically a tasks/resources allocation, a matching between agents
or a joint decision. Agents’ interests are conflicting in the sense that they cannot
be simultaneously fully satisfied. In this perspective, negotiation can be seen as
a distributed search through a space of potential agreements [2].
In this paper, we present a concrete negotiation scenario where two agents are
situated in a maze and the negotiation outcome is a cell where they will meet.
Based on their individual preferences (a minimal distance from their location
computed from their partial knowledge of the environment), we propose a nego-
tiation protocol which allows agents to submit more than two proposals at the
same time and a strategy which consists in starting from the deal that is best
for the agent and then concedes. A concession of an agent means that she pro-
poses a new deal such there is no other preferred alternatives. Formally, we prove
that the agreement reached by such a negotiation process is Pareto-optimal and
a compromise, i.e. an alternative which minimizes the maximum effort for one
agent to reach it. Moreover, the path between the two agents emerges from the
repeated negotiations in our experiments.
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Paper Overview. Section 2 describes the addressed concrete problem and why
the negotiation frameworks in the literature are not sufficient for it. In section 3,
we introduce the basic notions in the background of our work. Section 4 proposes
a rule for multi-agents decision. Then, we present our negotiation game (Sec. 5).
We describe our experiments in section 6. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Problem
We consider here two agents which are paratroopers landed at the two opposite
corners of a maze. They aim at meeting as soon as possible, i.e minimizing the
maximum number of steps for one agent to reach the meeting point. Both of
them have a local perception of the environment. Each agent can perceive the
walls of her current cell. Moreover, she knows her own location. Contrary to the
classical rendezvous problem [3], the agents are allowed to communicate in order
to negotiate the meeting point. Moreover, the meeting point can be re-negotiated
during the exploration of the maze. The optimal solution for finding a meeting
point requires the knowledge of the whole maze. Under this assumption, the
agents can compute the shortest path between them and set the meeting point in
the middle of it. By contrast, a solution which does not need any prior knowledge
consists of pseudo-randomly selecting a meeting point in the first diagonal.
In order to illustrate this problem, we consider a 3× 3 maze (cf Fig.1). At the
second step of the resolution, Alice is in the cell d while Bob is in the cell f . Each
agent computes the distance to reach all the other cells based on its knowledge.
For this purpose, an agent takes into consideration the perceived walls and she
assumes that there is no wall between the cells it did not visit yet. In other
words, the computation is performed by an A-star algorithm where the future
path-cost function is the Manhattan distance. For instance, Bob supposes that
3 steps are required to reach the cell c since she is aware there is a wall between
c and f , and so it plans to go through e and b. However, this path cannot be
followed since there is a wall between e and b the agent is not aware of.
Since we want to minimize the maximum number of steps for an agent to
reach the meeting point, the cell e is a good candidate even if d, e and f are
Pareto-optimal (see Def. 1). In order to solve this distributed solving problem, we
need a negotiation protocol and a strategy which allow to reach a fair solution.
It is worth noticing that the communication of their position is not enough to
reach a rendezvous with a pure strategy [3]. Moreover, the communication of the
wall is useless since the agents explore different parts of the maze.
Related Works. Many negotiation frameworks have been proposed in the lit-
erature (see [1] for a survey) depending on the object of negotiation, the agents’
preferences (2 or n), the protocol and the strategy. First of all, we consider here
2 agents (the paratroopers) negotiating a single-issue with discrete values (the
meeting point).
Model for the Agents’ Preferences. Most of the literature assume that the
preferences are represented by utility functions in order to negotiate a payoff,
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Fig. 1. The maze (at middle) and its internal representation for Alice (at left) and Bob
(at right) at time t = 2. In the latters, the visited cells are in grey, some walls may be
still unknown and each cell is labelled with an estimation of the shortest path length.
i.e a point on the curve of these functions. In our particular example, we can
remark that two points are at the same distance of Alice : a and e. Then,
we must propose a negotiation strategy based on large preferences for agents.
More generally, we will only assume a preference relation which is incomplete in
order to consider not only the indifference but also the incomparability between
alternatives. [4] allows agents to have a qualitative preference model (i.e. a CP-
net) for negotiating. Similarly, we will compute the rank of an alternative using
its depth in the preference graph.
Protocol. The negotiation protocol is the set of rules which regulates the ex-
changes of proposals. It can be symmetric (e.g. [5]) or asymmetric (e.g. [6]).
Contrary to [4], our protocol does not give the priority to one agent and each
agent can submit more than one alternative at each round: it is required for
reaching a fair agreement with large preferences.
Strategy. The negotiation strategy must be set up according to the model
for the agents’ preferences and the protocol. Its features are the availability of
information about opponents and its efficiency. While some negotiation strategies
make the assumption of perfect information (e.g. [5]) we think we cannot make
such assumption in our context. Most of the existing strategies leads to a Pareto-
optimal solution (e.g. [5]). Additionally, we aims at proposing a negotiation
process for distributed problem solving which minimizes the maximum effort for
one agent. [7] considers social choice theory to allow agents to choose among
alternatives based on their social value since it knows the preferences of others.
We do not assume here any knowledge about the preferences of the opponents.
In summary, we aim at proposing:
1. a negotiation strategy based on large (and eventually incomplete) preferences
which does not assume that agents know the preferences of each other;
2. a protocol which allows more than two offers per round;
3. a fair negotiation process which does not give priority to one agent and which
minimize the maximum effort for one agent.
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3 Background
In order to represent the taste of the decision maker and to compare the alterna-
tives to each other, we assume here a preference relation on a non-empty finite
set of alternatives X , i.e. a preorder relation (reflexive and transitive) denoted
. By contrast, the corresponding strict preference relation (denoted ≻) is a
strict order, i.e. transitive and asymmetric. The indifference relation captures
the indifference of the decision maker between alternatives. It means that the
decision maker believes that, according to its preferences, there is no real dif-
ference between x and y. Moreover, We remark that the preference relation can
be incomplete. Two alternatives can be incomparable if it is impossible for the
decision maker to compare them. It can be interpreted as a way for the deci-
sion maker to refuse to commit due to an uncertain judgment. Contrary to the
indifference relation, the incomparability relation is not transitive.
The notion of non-dominance allows to distinguish the alternatives for which
there is no preferred alternatives. The set of non-dominated alternatives
over X wrt  is the set: ND(X ,) = {x ∈ X | ∀y ∈ X ,¬(y ≻ x)}. It is worth
noticing that there is always at least one non-dominated alternative.
Example 1. We consider here the set of alternatives X = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i}
and the two preference relations 1 and 2 over X corresponding to our previous
example. In our case, a cell is preferred to another if the estimated distance
towards the first cell is at least as good as the second cell. The preference graph
of 1 (resp. 2) is represented at left (resp. at right) of Fig. 2 as a directed
graph where a node represents an alternative and there is a edge from x to y
when x is at least as good as y. We can remark that ND(X ,1) = {d} and
ND(X ,2) = {f}.
d
a e
b f h
c g i
f
e i
b d h
a c h
Fig. 2. Preference relation 1 (at left) and 2 (at right)
We focus now on a group of agents (two or more) taking a joint decision. We
consider here a non-empty finite set of alternatives X , a set of agents Ω and for
each agent i ∈ Ω, i is the preference relation for i over X .
The Pareto rule is used by a group of agents to compare two alternatives. An
alternative x Pareto-dominates an alternative y for a group of agents if x is at
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least as good as y for all the agents and at least one agent strictly prefers x to
y. An alternative is Pareto-optimal if it is not Pareto-dominated.
Definition 1 (Pareto). The Pareto-dominance relation ≻Ω ⊆ X × X is
defined such that ∀(x, y) ∈ X 2, x ≻Ω y ⇔ (∀i ∈ Ω, x i y)∧ (∃j ∈ Ω, x ≻i y).
The set of Pareto-optimal alternatives for Ω over X is the set
ND(X ,≻Ω) = {x ∈ X | ∀y ∈ X ¬(y ≻Ω x)}
It is worth noticing that the Pareto-dominance is a strict order. The Pareto-
optimality captures the notion of rationality for multi-agents. Indeed, the alter-
natives are Pareto-dominated since, from the viewpoint of the group of agents,
better alternatives are available. Moreover, there is always a Pareto-optimal al-
ternative. The Pareto-optimality is not a sufficiently discriminatory rule. For
instance, in our previous example (cf. Fig. 2), the set of Pareto-optimal alterna-
tives is {e, d, f}. However, e seems to be more“fair” than d and f .
4 Multi-agents Decision
We aim at setting a rule for multi-agents decision which is Pareto-inclusive and
we want to warrant the existence of a solution. We call them compromises.
Like the utility functions allow to evaluate the individual satisfaction of agents,
we introduce a rank function for evaluating the effort performed by an agent to
accept an alternative.
Definition 2 (Individual rank function). Let i the preference relation of
the agent i over X . Our rank function is defined such that :
r(x,X ,i) =
{
1 if x ∈ ND(X ,i)
1 + r(x,X \ND(X ,i),i) otherwise
The rank of an alternative is its level on the preference graph. By taking into
account the rank of an alternative, we make the assumption that any concession
- the fact to withdraw an alternative for a worst one - of any agent represents
the same effort.
In order to obtain Pareto-optimal and fair alternatives, we define the leximin
rule on the alternative ranks.
Definition 3 (Leximin Preference). Let x, y ∈ X be two alternatives. We
denote xr(Ω) = (x1, . . . , xn), the vector of alternative ranks in decreasing order.
We say that x is strictly leximin-preferred than y (denoted x ≻lex y) iff
∃k ≤ n, ∀i < k, xi = yi and xk < yk. The leximin-optimal set over X is
ND(X ,≻lex).
The leximin relation is a partial strict order.
All the compromises are Pareto-optimal and there is always one.
Bilateral Negotiation of a Meeting Point in a Maze 91
Property 1 (Compromises)
1. Compromises(X , Ω) ⊆ ND(X ,≻Ω).
2. There always exists x ∈ X such that x ∈ Compromises(X , Ω).
Proof 1 (Compromises)
1. Proof by contradiction. Let x be a compromise over X for Ω. We assume
that there is y ∈ X which Pareto-dominates x. From Def. 1, we deduce (1)
∀i ∈ Ω, y i x and (2) there exists an agent j ∈ Ω such that y ≻j x.
From (1) and Def. 2, we deduce that ∀i ∈ Ω, r(x,X ,≻i) ≥ r(y,X ,≻i).
From (2) and Def. 2, we deduce there exists an agent j ∈ Ω such that
r(x,X ,≻j) > r(y,X ,≻j). From Def. 3, we deduce that y ≻lex x and so x is
not a compromise, which is a contradiction.
2. Since the leximin is an order over a non-empty finite set, this set contains
at least one minimal element.
We can remark that some Pareto-optimal may not be compromises. In our ex-
ample (cf. Fig 2), e is the only compromise.
In summary, a compromise captures the fairness of a solution. This rule is
Pareto-inclusive and a compromise always exists.
5 Bilateral Negotiation
We propose a bilateral negotiation game in order to reach an agreement. Firstly,
we introduce the protocol. Secondly, we present a negotiation strategy. Finally,
we evaluate the agreements.
Protocol. Since we do not want to give priority to the agent which speaks first,
we consider here a simultaneous game made of several rounds. For this purpose,
we introduce an arbitration mechanism1.
At each round, the arbitrator collects the proposals - each of them is a set
of alternatives. The protocol forbids the empty proposals and the repetition of
an alternative in two proposals of the same participant. When an alternative
is proposed by both participants, the arbitrator closes the game, detects the
agreements and informs the participants. Otherwise, it forwards these proposals
to the other participant and a new round starts (see Fig. 3).
In the rest of this paper, we denote p1(k) the proposal of the agent 1 at round
k ≥ 1, i.e. a set of alternatives. At each round t, we denote H1(t) the history of
the proposals of the agent 1 such that H1(t) =
⋃
k<t p1(k) and H(t) is the game
history H(t) = H1(t)∪H2(t). Moreover, the set of alternatives sent by the agent
1 during the history H1(t) is denoted P1(t) = {x ∈ X | ∃p ∈ H1(t) , x ∈ p}.
At each round t, if the arbitrator identifies at least one alternative proposed
by both participants, the game ends. The arbitrator gives priority to the alter-
natives which appear earlier in the history (cf. Algo. 1) and it returns this set
1 For clarity, we choose to implement the synchronization with a mediator. However,
decentralized solutions are easy to establish.
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Fig. 3. Protocol for the participants (at top) and for the arbitrator (at bottom). The
initial states are represented by double circles and the final ones are in black.
of alternatives, called agreements, to the participants. An agreement is not
necessarily unique. In order to reach a collective decision, the arbitrator may
select one agreement by using a (pseudo-)randomized function.
Algorithm 1. Arbitration
Data: H(t): history, p1(t) and p2(t) : proposals
1 for k = 0 to t do
2 A = (p1(k) ∩ p2(t)) ∪ (p2(k) ∩ p1(t)) ;
3 if A = ∅ then
4 send({a1, a2}, agreement(A));
5 return;
6 send(a2, proposal(p1(t)));
7 send(a1, proposal(p2(t)));
Strategy. The strategy of a participant interfaces with the protocol through the
condition mechanism of utterance and interpretation of the proposals. Obviously,
when an agent receives a proposal, she updates her representation of the history.
The content of the proposals is determined by the strategy of the agent.
In this section, we adopt the viewpoint of the agent 1 (since the roles are
symmetric). Her strategy (see Algo. 2) is legal: a proposal is not empty and the
alternatives are not repeated in its proposals. Moreover, the strategy is rational:
the agent chooses among the legal alternatives (X ′) those that may be compro-
mises from her viewpoint. The negotiation heuristic consists in choosing among
the rational alternatives.
A conciliatory agent selects all the rational alternatives in order to reach
an agreement as soon as possible (select(Rat,H(t)) = Rat). By contrast, other
strategies may aim at minimizing the individual rank of an agreement. Since we
consider distributed problem solving, we will make the assumption that agents
are collaborative and so conciliatory. An agent concedes since she proposes a
new deal such there is no other preferred alternatives which are legal.
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Algorithm 2. Negotiation strategy
Data: H(t): the history, X : the set of alternatives
1 X ′ = X \ P1(t) ;
2 Rat = ND(X ′,1) ;
3 E = select(Rat,H(t));
4 send(arbitrator, proposal(E));
Example 2. Let us consider the preferences represented in Fig. 2. We consider
the negotiation games where the agent 1 (resp. 2) adopts a conciliatory strategy.
In this game, the agent 1 (resp. 2) starts with the alternative d (resp. the alter-
native f). At the second round, the agent 1 offers both a and e while the agent
2 offers both e and i. Therefore, e is an agreement.
Theoretical Evaluation. We identify here the properties of the agreements.
First, we can remark that the negotiation game always leads to an agreement.
Property 2 (Guaranteed success). Our negotiation game ends successfully.
Proof 2 (Guaranteed success). Since the set of alternatives is finite and the
protocol forbids the repetition of alternatives in the proposals of the same agent,
the game ends. The set of alternatives with the precedence relation in the history
is an non-empty and finite set with a total order. Therefore, this set has always
at least one minimal element, i.e. an agreement.
An agreement reached by a negotiation game between two conciliatory agents
is a Pareto-optimal alternative and a compromise.
Theorem 1 (Agreements). If both participants adopt a conciliatory strategy,
then the set of agreements reached ACC ⊆ X is such that:
1. ACC ⊆ ND(X ,Ω)
2. xCC ∈ ACC ⇒ compromise(xCC , Ω,X )
First, we remark that the timing of proposals depends on their rank.
Lemma 1. Let x ∈ X be an alternative and a negotiation game which stops at
time θ > 0. r(x,X ,≻i) < θ ⇒ x ∈ pi(r(x,X ,≻i)).
Proof 3 (Agreements)
1. Let x ∈ ACC be an agreement. We prove by contradiction that ACC ⊆
ND(X ,Ω). We assume x /∈ ND(X ,Ω). Therefore, ∃y, (y ≻1 x ∧ y 2
x)∨ (y ≻2 x∧y 1 x). So, ∃t, y ∈ P1(t)∧y ∈ P2(t)∧ (x /∈ P1(t)∨x /∈ P2(t)).
Therefore x /∈ ACC which is a contradiction.
2. Let x ∈ ACC be an agreement and θ the time when the game stops.
Proof by contradiction. We assume x /∈ Compromises(X , Ω). (A)
From (A) and Def. 3 and Prop. 1, ∃y ∈ X , y ≻lex x. (B)
From Def. 3 and (B), we distinguish 2 cases:
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(a) maxa∈Ω r(y,X ,a) < maxa∈Ω r(x,X ,a) (C)
From (C) and Lemma 1, we deduce there exists t ≥ 1 when both par-
ticipants play y but only one have played x. Therefore, from Algo. 1,
x /∈ ACC , which is a contradiction.
(b) maxa∈Ω r(y,X ,a) = maxa∈Ω r(x,X ,a) (D) and
mina∈Ω r(y,X ,a) < mina∈Ω r(x,X ,a) (E).
From (D), (E) and Lemma 1, we deduce that x is played first before y
while x and y are played a second time during the same round. From
Algo. 1, we deduce that x /∈ ACC , which is a contradiction.
Actually, the game aims at splitting the effort between the participants.
6 Experiments
Our experiments aim at comparing the improvement of the distributed solving
with the negotiation and its communication costs.
The pseudo-random generation of a maze of size n× n is performed by:
– a pseudo-randomized version of Prim’s algorithm. This algorithm results in
mazes with many short dead ends and the solution is usually pretty direct
as well;
– a depth-first search algorithm. This algorithm results in mazes with fewer
but longer dead ends, and the solution is usually very long and twisty.
We pseudo-randomly generate a new n× n maze, then we try to solve the cor-
responding problem by:
1. the pseudo-randomly selection of a meeting point in the fist diagonal;
2. the negotiation of the meeting point at each step;
3. the negotiation of the meeting point every 2 steps;
4. the negotiation of the meeting point every 4 steps;
5. the negotiation of the meeting point each time the path length towards the
meeting point increases for one agent due to the discovery of a wall.
We consider n ∈ [2; 14] and for each n, we generate 100 experiments.
In Fig. 4, we consider the maximum number of steps for one agent and the total
number for the two agents. Negotiating rather than pseudo-randomly choosing
a meeting point improves the time to reach it. More surprisingly, the global
satisfaction of the agents is improved by the negotiation in simple mazes. In
other words, negotiations may help to find shortest paths.
In Fig. 5, we compare the communication cost of our different strategies in
terms of number of negotiations, total number of rounds and total number of
proposed alternatives. The results are presented for mazes generated with the
randomize version of Prim’s algorithm but they are very similar when the depth-
first search algorithm is used. Negotiating at each step increases the commu-
nication cost with similar results for the number of steps. It seems that the
communication cost of the strategies # 3 and # 5 are similar.
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Fig. 4. Maximum number of steps by one agent and the total number of steps per-
formed by two agents with mazes generated with a pseudo-randomized version of Prim’s
algorithm (top) and with a depth-first search algorithm (bottom).
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Fig. 5. Number of negotiations (at top), rounds (at center) and proposals (at bottom)
We generate now a 8× 8 maze with the pseudo-randomized version of Prim’s
algorithm and the location of the agents. We partially destroy the walls until
the density (nb of walls/nb of initial walls) is d %. Then, we try to solve the
corresponding problem with the help of our 5 strategies. We consider d ∈ [0; 100].
For each d, we generate 100 experiments. In Fig. 6, we observe that negotiating
rather than pseudo-randomly choosing a meeting point improves the time to
reach it. Moreover, we cannot distinguish the efficiency of the different strategies.
However, these strategies have different communication cost. For instance, the
strategy # 5 is closed to the strategy # 3 when the density is is high.
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Fig. 6. Number of maximum steps (at left) and proposals (at right) depending on the
density of the maze
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In order to resume, the strategy #4 seems to be the best one due to the
maximum number of steps by one agent and its communication cost whatever
the maze is.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a negotiation protocol which allows agents to
make more than two offers per round and a negotiation strategy based on large
(and eventually incomplete) preferences which does not assume that agents know
the preferences of each other. In this way, we have proposed a fair negotiation
process which does not give priority to one agent and which minimizes the maxi-
mum effort for one agent. We have applied our framework for distributed problem
solving. In particular, we have considered the case of two agents in a maze which
aims at negotiating a meeting in order to reach it as soon as possible. In our
experiments, the negotiation improves the resolution of this problem and the
path between the agents emerge from the repeated negotiations.
We are currently extending our bilateral negotiation game to a multi-party
negotiation game with more than two agents. Even if our definitions for con-
cessions and compromises are suitable, we adapt the negotiation strategies and
the arbitration mechanism. In this way, we will allow more than two agents to
negotiate a meeting point.
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